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that calls for a change in business as usual. At least the possibility should
be considered that, say, sincere Muslims should rethink their beliefs in
light of the available alternatives - irrespective of what their tradition may
antecedently have had to say about this. The question of what changes
people might need to make is at least as interesting as the question of what
answer they are currently disposed to provide. The conservative approach
advocated here seems to me to exclude from consideration a realistic
appraisal of the significance of religious diversity.
5. Why is it that "[religious] diversity raises some questions about the
epistemic confidence with which religious people do and should treat the
assents they understand to be required of them by belonging to their religion"(66)? There is a problenl of religious diversity only if you think that
other traditions count for something, have something to offer, are
admirable, might be leamed from, are worth taking seriously, and so forth.
If you think that none of this is so, there is no problem. Griffiths takes the
issue of diversity seriously enough to write a book about it. Yet his
response, in large part, is to say: here are the facts of religious diversity;
and here is the response of my tradition to th.ose facts. End of discussion.
But this should be the beginning of discussion.
I enjoyed reading Griffiths' book. It is a valuable contribution to discussion of its topic and there certainly is much to be learned from it. Yet my
judgment is that it does not respond adequately to the problems with
which it is wrestling.

Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity, by Robert McKim. New York:
Oxford Vniversity Press, 2001. Pp. xi, 280. $47.50.
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, Vniversity of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Robert McKim's book is predicated upon the assumption that "the world is
religiously ambiguous;" "it is possible to interpret the world in a variety of
religious ways, and to interpret it naturalistically," and "to do so without
any loss of rationality" (21).
One consequence of this ambiguity is the divine hiddenness. Part I
explores its nature and implications. After offering reasons for thinking
that God's hiddenness is pervasive, McKim divides theological explanations of it into three types: appeals to human defectiveness, to divine transcendence, and (most important) to the advantages of hiddenness. The following chapters explore these alleged "benefits of mystery"-that "God
must be hidden if we are to be able to make morally sigtuficant choices"
(26), that divine hiddenness is a necessary condition of our freedom to
believe or not believe, that it is apresupposition of trust, worship, and the
like-and assesses the claim that, if God exists, it is reasonable to suppose
that there are goods of mystery that are unknown to uso McKim's conclusion is that (1) while these proposals have their problems, at least some of
them may contribute to an explanation of God's hiddenness and that (2)
"although the mystery that surrounds the nature and existence of God is a
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serious problem for theism, it does not [pace Schellenberg and others] provide the basis for a convincing argument for atheism" (92).
God's hiddenness does have two important implications, however.
First, religious belief should be tentative. "[T]he fact that God is hidden (if
God exists) suggests that one ought to be wary of the claims that the theistic traditions make about God: they probably are claims that exceed what
may reasonably be said with confidence....Mystery...requires a more tentative, more modest, more agnostic faith" (122-3). Second (and more interesting), if God is hidden, religious belief cannot have the importance that
the religious traditions attribute to it. McKim's arguments for this claim
are briefly these: The fact that God is hidden when he might not have been
(or when he might have been less l1idden than he is) suggests that God
does not place as much importance on belief as theists think he does.
Furthermore, "if God would create the best world that God could create,
then, if God exists, this world in which there is ambiguity, with the result
that some believe and some do not believe, is better than a world in which
it is clear that God exists. If so, it is not likely that belief as such is very
important: if it were, it probably would be clearer than it now is that God
exists" (122 f.). If, on the other hand, God's goodness would only preclude
hirn from creating a world in which " we are...deprived by our circumstances of any good that is necessary for our long-term flourishing" (120),
then, a similar conclusion still folIows: "God's hiddenness does not deprive
us of any good that is essential" to our flourishing " in spite of the fact that
it has the result that many people do not hold theistic belief" (123). In
either case, then, "it probably is not important that we believe here and
now" (123).
Part 11 explores related problems created by the fact that judges of
apparently equal intellectual, moral, and spiritual competence hold incompatible beliefs about religious matters without there being any non-ques-

tion begging and/or universally compelling way of showing that the religious beliefs of one set of competent judges (e.g., Christian intellectuals)
are rationally superior to those of another (e.g., Buddhist intellectuals).
McKim argues that in the face of this diversity we should adopt the
"Critical Stance." This stance is defined by two principles. The first is:
The "E-principle": "Disagreement [among competent inquirers]
about an issue or area of inquiry provides reason to think that each
side has an obligation to examine beliefs about that issue" (140).
The sort of examination required by the principle should be distinguished
from both "conservative" and "radical" approaches to controversial issues.
The former "is likely to .. .involve the assumption that the rules for
inquiry...such as rules concerning what you should take for granted, how
far you should go in your investigation, what sort of findings you should
be satisfied with, and what you conceive of as the purpose of engaging in
the process, are dictated by the tradition to which you belong" (147). The
latter regards "everything as 'up for grabs'; one's prior commitments are to
be seen as just one of numerous possibilities" with no more claim upon the
inquirer than any other possibility (147). "The process of examination for
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which" McKim wishes "to make a case," on the other hand, lies between
these two extremes (147).
The second component of the Critical Stance is:
The "T-principle": "Disagreement (of the sort under discussion)
about an issue or area of inquiry provides reason for whatever beliefs
we hold about that issue or area of inquiry to be tentative" (141).
How tentative should we be? "[T]he extent to which we are open to the
possibility that we might be wrong about a belief admits of degrees. There
is a spectrum of possibilities that extends from, at one extreme, a recognition that a belief could conceivably need revision to, at the other extreme,
thinking it sufficiently likely that we are wrong about it that we barely
hold on to it" (156). Tentative belief is belief. Tentatively believing p
involves believing that p is true and its denial false, and is incompatible
with also believing that "the truth of p remains to be settled" (158).
Nevertheless, the sort of belief enjoined by the T-principle occupies an
"area between [the] two extremes" lying "toward the latter end of the spectrum" (156, myemphasis).
McKim admits that religious experiences which were as clear and compelling as our experiences of other people or an external world could, in
principle, "outweigh the considerations which...make for the Critical
Stance" (224). The concluding chapters argue against Alston and others
that most religious experiences are not of this sort, and that even those
which are (if any) "have, at most, a capacity to support only some of the
beliefs that one has in virtue of membership in a religious tradition" (225).
McKim concludes that the Critical Stance emerges unscathed.
McKim's theses are important and carefully supported. They are also
problematic.
1. Many theists believe that a robust religious faith should be grounded
in God's revealed word, not reason. Why should these theists be bothered
by McKim's case against the rational appropriateness of robust belief? As
McKim puts the objection: "Admittedly there is an opposition between the
Critical Stance and orthodox religion; but what makes you think that the
Critical Stance should take priority? ..if you approach these issues as an
exercise in detached reflection, and while presupposing a Western, postEnlightenment epistemology, there may be something to be said for" your
views, but why should we do so (191)? McKim's response is that "if a
strong case can be make for the Critical Stance," one should not "be concemed about the fact tlLat it will be fOtlnd to be unsatisfactory from many
religious points of view." The objection "consists in pointing out that the
Critical Stance is alien to, and would be opposed by, many religious
groups" but that, of course, is just what one would expect. (191-2)
This is too quick, however, for it doesn't answer the orthodox believer's
question, namely, why should he or anyone else adopt the postEnlightenment epistemological standpoint from which the Critical Stance
appears reasonable? It won't do to simply rehearse the case for tlLe Critical
Stance since the power of that case depends upon the legitimacy of the epistemological standpoint whose credentials are at issue.
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2. Deep disagreements aren't peeuliar to religion. They are equally pervasive in morality, politics, philosophy, and the like. Should our opinions
in these areas therefore also be held tentatively? McKim's response is
roughly this: Parties to these disputes aren't always equally competent.
"An apologist for slavery," for example, is "in the grip of a palpably mistaken belief." In other cases, there may be "no correct position" (200).
Where subjectivism or relativism is not an option, however, and the disputants are equally competent, our moral, political, and philosophical
beliefs should be held tentatively, although McKim admits that in philosophy, at least, "there are advantages to positions...being taken nontentatively: advances in the field seem to come in part as a result of the fact that
well-defined positions are defended wholeheartedly" (201).
There are diffieulties with this. Competent inquirers disagree over the
truth of ethical egoism, for example, and the value of a democratic polity.
Is it really clear, though, that I should be only a tentative non-egoist or a
tentative democrat? There is also something problematic about McKim's
claim that even though each philosopher should hold her beliefs tentatively, philosophy is best served if some philosophical beliefs are held non-tentatively. Assuming that, as a philosopher, I know that the discipline is best
served by many philosophers adopting their beliefs wholeheartedly,
should I therefore encourage at least some philosophers to ignore their
obligations under the T-principle? Should I ignore my own obligation to
believe tentatively, that is, should my commitment to the discipline override my commitment to the T-principle? And if it should, why might not
something similar be true of religion? For it is at least arguable that
Christianity, say, or Buddhism would cease to flourish if most of its members weren't wholeheartedly committed to it.
3. Can full-blooded religious belief be tentative? After all, "the sort of
belief that religions typically recommend, and in some case require, is
more than tentative in nature" (159). In response to this question, McKim
points out that tentative belief is compatible with many sorts of commitment. Christianity, for example, may "continue to provide you with an
interpretation, or partial interpretation, of many phenomena...." (166). It
mayaIso "be the foeus of many of your hopes," and you may be "throughly committed to a certain way of life or to certain ways of behaving that
have been associated...with your beliefs...." (167). In addition, you may be
committed to the Christian community, and "to keeping as many as possible of your [Christian] beliefs intact" compatible with your adoption of the
Critical Stance (169-70).
McKim acknowledges, however, that the tentativeness of one's beliefs will
affeet the quality of one's commitment. One's religious interpretations "will
feel more optional" (166), one's connections to the Christian community will
be looser, and the charaeter of one's trust in God will be different. (McKim
asks us to "imagine the implications for my faith that John will meet me at the
appointed hour if" it isn't "completely clear even that John exists" [176 f.].)
Most tellingly, McKim admits that tentative belief should lead the Christian
to question "the importance of the projeet of converting others," and "some of
the more radical biblical injunctions, such as the injunction to care not for the
morrow or to love your neighbor as yourself..." (163). Furthermore, "the ten-
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tative believer probably will be more willing to abandon her position for the
sake of some worthwhile and important earthly good for herself and to think
it appropriate to do so if this sort of situation were to arise" (164 f.). In fact, an
implication of McKim's "position is that most martyrs [including those in
one's own tradition] who have died for their faith have been misled" (204).
Most traditional theists, I should think, would regard this as a reductio ad
absurdum of the claim that tentative religious belief can be an adequate substitute for the faith valorized in their traditions. Traditional Christians will be
particularly unhappy since it implies that not only Peter and Paul and other
early martyrs but Jesus himself were seriously in error.
4. Can't one tentatively embrace a position which includes the belief
that one should hold all of its central beliefs non-tentatively? Suppose that
Sarah believes tl1at Rl, R2,... Rn are good reasons for embracing traditional
Christianity and therefore does so but, having adopted the Critical Stance,
does so tentatively. So one of the things Sarah now tentatively believes is
that her embrace of Christianity should not be tentative. And since (as
McKim points out) tentative belief is belief, she therefore takes steps to
ensure that her belief in Christianity will become wholehearted. I do not
think that Sarah's behavior is either incoherent or irrational. But notice
that if it is incoherent or irrational, then one can't coherently or rationally
tentatively adopt traditional Christianity even though one may have what
appears to one to be good reasons Jor doing so. (McKim notes an objection lying
in this neighborhood in a footnote but "wonders why Christians could not
shed this particular belief [that Christian "belief must involve decisive
assent"] and yet keep all or most of their other beliefs intact" [267]. The
suggestion presumably is that one could tentatively embrace most of the
Christian package without even tentatively embracing the belief that
Christian belief should be non-tentative. This is doubtful, however, since
the valorization of wholehearted belief appears inextricably bound up with
Christian beliefs about sin, grace, and salvation. It is difficult to imagine
what Paul's letters would look like, for example, if divested of the belief
that assent to the great things of the gospel should be wholehearted.)
In spite of these problems, however, I recommend this book. Anyone
interested in issues raised by divine hiddenness or religious diversity, or in
the nature of a reasonable religious faith, should examine it carefully.
McKim's arguments are detailed, balanced, and to the point. Future writers on these topics must take them into account.

God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. GanssIe; contributors: William Lane
Craig, Paul Helm, Alan Padgett, and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Downer's Grove,
11: InterVarsity Press, 2001). ISBN:0-8308-1551-1. Pp.247, $18.00 paper.
JEREMY PIERCE, Syracuse University
This book packages somewhat popularly a scholarly debate previously
available almost entirely in philosophy journals and hardcover monographs. Greg Ganssie's introduction covers the main issues in the fairly

